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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 78A-4-
103(2)(b) and (j) (2008). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL 
I. DID THE DISTRICT COURT ERR IN RULING THAT THE FACTS AS 
ALLEGED BY PLAINTIFF COULD NOT SUPPORT A CLAIM THAT 
DEFENDANT'S DENIAL OF PLAINTIFF'S ANNEXATION PETITION 
WAS ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS, OR ILLEGAL? 
II. DID THE DISTRICT COURT ERR IN RULING THAT THE FACTS AS 
ALLEGED BY PLAINTIFF COULD NOT SUPPORT A CLAIM FOR 
INVERSE CONDEMNATION? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
A district court order granting a motion to dismiss is reviewed on appeal for 
correctness, giving no deference to the trial court's determination. Code v. Utah Dep't of 
Health, 2007 UT App 390, ^ 3, 174 P.3d 1134. A trial court considering a motion to 
dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) is required to accept the facts as pleaded as true. Russell v. 
Standard Corp., 898 P.2d 263, 264 (Utah 1995). Accordingly, the facts asserted herein 
are deemed admitted for the purposes of this appeal. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES / ORDINANCES 
Utah Code Annotated §10-9a-801(3). See Addendum 1. 
STATEMENT OF CASE AND COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
I. Nature of the Case 
Plaintiff / Appellant Ralph Merrill, d/b/a Quinn's Junction Partnership ("QJP") 
filed this action to challenge the decision by Defendant / Appellee Park City ("Park 
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City") to deny QJP's annexation petition. QJP alleged that although the property at issue 
in this dispute (the "QJP Property") lies in Summit County, outside the boundaries of 
Park City, that Park City has for at least the past fifteen (15) years exercised land use 
control over the QJP Property by virtue of certain agreements between Summit County 
and Park City. As set forth in greater detail below, Park City denied QJP's annexation 
petition as part of an ongoing course of conduct, which has included several moratoria on 
development and impossible development requirements, designed to preclude all 
development on the property, and either maintain the property in its current undeveloped 
state or obtain the property for open space at an artificially depressed price. In addition, 
by exercising its annexation power to maintain the QJP Property as open space by 
preventing any economically viable use for the QJP Property, Park City inversely 
II. Course of Proceedings and Order Dismissing Complaint 
District Judge Lubeck dismissed QJP's Revised Second Amended Complaint on 
April 22, 2008, ruling that the facts as alleged by QJP could not establish that Park City's 
denial of QJP's annexation petition was arbitrary, capricious, or illegal, and that QJP had 
failed to state a valid claim for inverse condemnation. See Order of April 22, 2008, 
Addendum 2. QJP appeals from that Order of dismissal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The following facts must be accepted as true and considered in the light most 
favorable to QJP. 
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Parties 
1. Plaintiff, Ralph Merrill, d/b/a Quinn's Junction Partnership, ("QJP") has for 
the past eighteen (18) years been the owner of approximately thirty (30) acres of real 
property in the Snyderville Basin, Summit County, Utah (the "QJP" property). (R. 140, ^  
i). 
2. Defendant Park City ("Park City") is a body politic and a political 
subdivision of the State of Utah. (R. 140, ^ 3). 
The QJP Property 
3. The QJP Property lies northeast of Park City and is contiguous to Park 
City's boundary on the north and contiguous to a parcel of property owned by Barnes 
Bank, which has been annexed into Park City. The QJP Property is physically located on 
the Southwest comer of the major intersection of U.S. Interstate 40 and State Pvoad 248, 
commonly referred to as Quinn's Junction. (R. 141, ^ 6; see also Exhibit 2). 
General Allegations 
4. QJP purchased the QJP Property in 1990 at commercial prices because at 
that time the QJP Property was the only property in Quinn's Junction designated as a 
hard commercial zone. (R. 141-142, ffif 8, 11-12). 
5. Extensive infrastructure for commercial development was placed at or near 
QJP Property, including the only sewer line along the southwest corridor of SR 248, 
within 400 feet of Quinn's intersection. (R. 141, U 9). 
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6. QJP relied on the commercial zone, as well as representations by City and 
County officials, in purchasing the property at commercial prices in about 1990. (R. 
141,111). 
7. QJP was assessed and paid a property tax based on the commercial zone 
for the QJP Property. (R. 142, ^ 12). 
8. On January 14, 1993, Summit County down-zoned the QJP Property from 
a commercial zone to a zone that allowed only 1 unit per 40 acres to be built no sooner 
than ten (10) years and as many as twenty (20) years into the future. (R. 142, ^ 14). 
9. On May 3, 1993, QJP filed an application with Summit County to amend 
the General Plan to reinstate the commercial use and eliminate the ten or twenty year 
delay so that QJP could obtain the rights to an economically viable use and immediate 
development. The application was denied. (R.142, ^ 15). 
10. At the time it denied QJP's May 3, 1993 application, Summit County had 
in place a land use plan giving land use control over the QJP Property to Park City 
because of interlocal agreements between the City and County and because the QJP 
Property was within Park City's annexation declaration zone. Summit County directed 
QJP to request all development approvals from Park City pursuant to the interlocal 
agreements between Park City and Summit County, which required Park City's approval 
for any development of the QJP Property. (R.142, fflf 13, 15, 17). 
11. QJP then proceeded to exhaust its administrative remedies against Summit 
County, eventually commencing litigation against Summit County, which is still 
pending, Merrill v. Summit County, Civil No. 950600004. QJP has simultaneously 
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pursued its vested rights and constitutional claims through administrative remedies 
provided by the City and County.1 (R. 142, ^ 16). 
12. On September 28, 1993, Summit County and Park City formalized their 
pre-existing agreement to allow Park City to exercise de facto control over property 
beyond its borders by executing a formal interlocal planning agreement (the "Interlocal 
Agreement"), which is still being enforced today. (R. 143, ^ J 18; see also Exhibit 5). 
13. Under the terms of the Interlocal Agreement, Summit County uauthorize[d] 
and formalize[d] Park City's participation in land use planning, development approvals, 
and the provision of urban services in unincorporated portions of Summit County and/or 
in proximity to the City limits." (Id.) 
14. In addition, the Interlocal Agreement provided that any development at 
Quinn's Junction, including the QJP Property, should be compatible with Park City's 
standards and requirements, which are not part of Summit County's land use code. (R. 
143,120). 
15. The effect of the September 28, 1993 Interlocal Agreement, as well as 
other agreements between Park City and Summit County, was to force QJP to obtain 
QJP believes Summit County should also be a party to this action, however, when the 
action was instituted QJP was already engaged with the County in an action before the 
Property Rights Ombudsmen. This action was dismissed before the Ombudsmen action 
was concluded and Summit County could be made a party. 
2
 Park City has also exercised control over the northeast side of Quinn's Junction, 
consistently reaffirming to QJP and the public at that time that no development would 
occur there because of wetland issues, slope, and critical open space view areas, even 
though the northeast side of Quinn's Junction was also not within Park City's boundaries. 
(R. 145,129; see also Exhibit 7). 
665 391935v4 5 
annexation into Park City and development approval from Park City before it could 
obtain any economically viable use for the QJP Property. (R. 144, % 22). 
16. The ultimate effect of the Interlocal Agreement and other City/County 
agreements was to force QJP to comply with ambiguous, often conflicting, and vague 
development criteria of Park City, even though the QJP Property was not located in Park 
City. (R. 144,^123). 
17. Even though the Interlocal Agreement expired by its terms, Park City is 
still exercising control of the QJP Property by requiring annexation and approval for any 
development. (R. 161, U 89). 
18. Over the next fifteen (15) years, QJP was not allowed to develop its 
property either in Summit County or Park City, although, as explained below, it 
continued to make diligent efforts to obtain development approval from both Park City 
and Summit County. (R. 144, ^ 26). As part of its efforts, QJP sought and obtained a 
hearing in Summit County regarding its claim that it possessed a vested right in certain 
development permits on the QJP Property. (R. 145, ^  28). 
19. In the vested rights hearing, Summit County, through its planning 
department, agreed to restore the previous commercial use to the QJP Property by 
designating the QJP Property 'commercial' in its general land use plan. On March 18, 
1996, Park City also recognized the restored commercial zoning of the QJP Property, 
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designating the property as commercial on its draft land-use maps and General Plan.3 
(R. 145,1 28; see also Exhibit 6). 
20. QJP was still not contiguous to Park City, however, so it could not apply 
for annexation at that time. (R. 145, ^ | 27). 
21. In about March 1996, Summit County, which had agreed to restore a 
commercial use to the QJP Property by virtue of the vested rights hearing on August 29, 
1995, reftised to do so. (R. 147, If 37). 
22. On March 20, 1997, Park City altered its General Plan, designating the QJP 
Property as only a "possible commercial receiving zone" instead of a commercial zone. 
(R. 145, ffi[ 30-31; see also Exhibit 8.) 
3
 The 1995 Park City General Plan shows the QJP Property as the only possible 
commercial use at Quinn's Junction. (R. 146, f^ 32; see also Exhibit 9). The 1995 Park 
City General Plan contains the following language relative to the Southwest comer of 
Quinn's Junction which includes the thirty (30) acre QJP parcel: 
It is expected that property owners will be able to achieve 
reasonable development potential from their land while 
meeting ... community objectives. (R. 146, f^ 34; Exhibit 10, 
p. 31). 
The 70-acre parcel [including the QJP 30-acres] is unique in 
character because of its highway access, visibility, relatively 
gentle topography, vegetation (agricultural use), relationship 
to other recreational attractions (specifically Jordanelle 
Reservoir), and relationship to the Silver Creek corridor. All 
of these features demand special focus. (R. 146, |^ 34; 
Exhibit 11, p. 43). 
[Guidelines [should be established] for a mixed use, 
clustered, commercial development on the Southwest comer 
parcel. (R. 146, If 34; Exhibit 12, p. 44). 
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23. The 1997 Park City General Plan, described above, contains the following 
language on page 38: 
Maintain an open space corridor from the ridge tops along 
highway 40 to highway 248. Using the ridge tops as a 
boundary, maintain the same open space corridor along the 
North side of the Highway 248 to the Treasure Mountain 
Middle school. (R. 146, U 35; Exhibit 13). 
24. During QJP's discussions with Summit County at this time, it was made 
clear to QJP that Park City's approval was necessary before any development could 
occur. (R. 147,U38). 
25. Despite the passage of both the County and City General Plans suggesting 
a possible commercial use for the QJP Property, both Park City and Summit County 
continued to obstruct QJP's efforts to obtain any development approval for the QJP 
T)vs^i*kC±-»*h*T o n AaoswilsaA \-%£*}s\wr /T> 1 A Q €T A A \ JL l V ^ p V ^ l t j , UO U V D U 1 U V U UC1UVV. VAV* 1 " T O ? || T* ) * 
26. In furtherance of this strategy of obstruction, Park City and Summit County 
informed QJP that as a pre-condition to any development application or formal 
annexation petition, QJP would be required to organize all property owners in the Park 
City annexation declaration zone, and prepare a master plan and annexation petition for 
the area. (R. 148, U 41). 
27. From 1998 through May 3, 1999, QJP attempted to organize and formulate 
a master plan with the property owners at Quinn's Junction as required by Park City. (R. 
148, U 42; see also Exhibit 15). 
28. Park City, however, continuously undermined QJP's attempts to organize 
property owners in annexation declaration zone by purchasing large tracts of property 
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from the very property owners QJP was directed to organize at Quinn's Junction. (R. 
149, H 47; see also Exhibit 17). 
29. Prior to May 3, 1999, while QJP was attempting to organize property 
owners, QJP was advised by Park City that it would not annex or approve any 
development on the QJP Property until after the 2002 Utah Winter Olympics. (R. 148, U 
43). 
30. Together with Summit County, Park City pursued a strategy of land use 
regulation which was intended to bankrupt QJP and other property owners or force QJP 
and others to sell their property to Park City as open space at a fraction of those 
properties' value by assuring they would never be annexed or allowed any economically 
viable use. (R. 148, U 44). 
Q 1 T-Joi/inrv r lo loxro/^ anxr r1o-«ro1r*r%mont n f f l i p (~\TT) Prr\r\f^-rf\T u n t i l a t l£»Qot *~)C\C\r) 
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Park City on May 3, 1999 sent QJP its first inquiry regarding purchasing the QJP 
Property, by letter from Sally Elliot (Summit County Commissioner from 2005 to 
present) through a Park City citizen group known as "COSAC." (R. 149, f^ 46; see also 
Exhibit 16). 
32. After the 2002 Utah Winter Olympics, QJP again approached Park City 
and Summit County about annexing and obtaining approval to develop the QJP Property. 
QJP was informed, however, that the City and the County had commenced a new land 
use study of Quinn's Junction and that no development would be accepted or approved 
until the completion of the Study. (R. 149, % 48). By letter to Park City, Summit County 
"made clear that both the County and City are legally prohibited from considering 
665 391935v4 9 
development proposals in the study-area until the study is complete." (R. 150, ^ 49; see 
also Exhibit 18 (emphasis added)). 
33. This prohibition on development was, in fact, an illegal moratorium 
prohibited under Utah law, including Utah Code Annotated 10-9a-504,4 imposing on 
QJP a temporary zoning ordinance (TZRO) without procedural due process. 
34. As part of their land-use study, Park City and Summit County hired Steve 
Coyle, an outside land use expert from Oregon, to review its land use regulations. On 
September 11, 2003, the consultant sent a draft report to Park City and to Summit 
County. (R. 151,1 53; see also Exhibit 20). 
35. Mr. Coyle's draft report found that Park City and Summit County land use 
regulations were vague, ambiguous, inequitable, and entirely subjective in their 
application, creating litigation by providing no clear objective criteria for development 
approvals. (R. 150, ^ 52; see also Exhibit 19). 
36. Mr. Coyle's report found the land use code was a discretionary code that in 
practice: 
• "[P]roduce[d] a high level of uncertainty about the 
successful outcome of a proposed development plan 
[due to the lack of] specific, measurable criteria for 
achieving an approval." 
• "[P]lace[d] virtually all of the responsibility on 
property owners ... to meet the code's discretionary 
criteria, [and provided] no clear plan approval 
pathway." 
Under Utah law a temporary land use regulation could not be longer than 6 months. 
U.C.A. § 10-9a-504(2). 
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• Rendered "appropriate design . . . secondary to a 
process that relies on a subjective evaluation by the 
agency reviewers." 
(R. 151, K 54; see also Exhibit 19, p. 2). 
37. Mr. Coyle's report found that Park City's and Summit County's 
discretionary land use policies had the effect of "1) creating a low density development 
on individual parcels that are neither resource efficient nor coherently planned in the 
larger context; 2) selling land as open space preserves, and; 3) litigation." (R. 151, ^ J 55; 
see also Exhibit 19, p. 2). 
38. Mr. Coyle's report also found that "while the purchase of land in the area 
as open space may be a stated goal of both City and County officials, intentionally or 
unintentionally relying on a discretionary code system to effectively reduce property 
vaiuca ma}' icauii 111 a itdd c^uitauit; iiicana IU ac incvc una cnu. ^IY. u i , ]| JV, ace aiai> 
Exhibit 19, p. 2). 
39. Mr. Coyle's report also criticized the political nature of the "discretionary 
zoning" system, which "vests substantial political control over the planning process 
[and] can provide leverage for the promotion of pro-growth, no-growth or other land use 
agendas by restricting or facilitating the location, quality, and quantity of development 
that is not tied to a specific plan." (R. 151-152, |^ 57; see also Exhibit 19, p. 2). 
40. Moreover, Mr. Coyle's report found that the political nature of the 
discretionary zoning system makes it difficult to achieve a "specific plan," or Master 
Plan for an area, because it "works against public support, [and inequitably creates] 
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higher-zoned economic winners and base-zone losers as a result of the planning process, 
a further deterrent to broad support." (R. 151-152, ^ 57; see also Exhibit 19, pp. 2-3). 
41. Mr. Coyle also found Quinn's Junction to be an appropriate location for 
commercial development, including retail, commercial mixed use, industrial and 
residential.5 (R. 152, ffi| 58-60; see also Exhibit 19, pp. 4-5). 
42. Rather than present this draft or submit a final report to the public, or have 
Mr. Coyle continue, Park City and Summit County terminated Mr. Coyle, buried the 
report from public view, and avoided the use of other outside consultants. (R. 152, j^ 61). 
43. Thereafter, Park City and Summit County prepared their own report titled 
'Quinn's Junction Study' (Joint Planning Commission Development Principles), which it 
thereafter treated as its General Plan (the f,OJ Studv"). (R. 153: 11 63: see also Exhibit 
V "V. m> / V ' II •> 
on 
44. On October 21, 2004, Park City annexed a portion of its own property on 
the north and east side of Quinn's Junction, making the QJP Property contiguous to the 
Park City limits for the first time. (R. 154, ^ 68). Before October 21, 2004, QJP could 
not file a petition to annex into Park City because the QJP Property was not contiguous 
to the City boundary. (R. 145, ^  27). 
45. After the October 21, 2004 annexation of the Park City parcel, QJP jointly 
petitioned for annexation into Park City with Barnes Bank, the owner of a parcel 
adjacent to the QJP Property. (R. 154, % 70). 
5
 There have been at least 3 major studies over the past 10 years which have consistently 
found a commercial demand at Quinn's Junction and the QJP Property as the logical 
place for a commercial node. (R. 152, fn. 2). 
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46. QJP and Barnes Bank hired the same consultant and prepared a joint 
petition showing the same master planned development on the fifty-four (54) contiguous 
acres they own adjacent to the City boundary. (R. 154, ^ j 71; see also Exhibit 22). 
47. For these services, QJP paid in excess of $50,000, which included a non-
refundable filing fee paid to Park City and a planning fee to the consultant. (R. 154, 
172). 
48. Because of expensive non-refundable filing fees, it has been the informal 
policy of Park City and prospective applicants to get preliminary approval from the 
agents and employees of the City prior to submission of an annexation petition. (R. 154, 
173). 
49. In accordance with that practice. QJP met with Park City and was told that 
0*1 o n n o v o f i A t i ••"vo+i+i r\tr* -rV*/-v-rv% f i TI3 n m n m !-»£» f m 7Ara/i /X? I ^ A CI / A \ 
till CAllllV^VCltlWll pWLltlVAll XI Will V^J-1 VVUU1U UW lavVJIVU. V±V* X "J~T'> I! ,~t)* 
50. On May 14, 2004, Park City had unanimously approved a prior pre-
annexation agreement with QJP which would have provided for substantial commercial 
development on the QJP Property. (R. 158, % 86(f); see also Exhibit 36). 
51. During meetings with Park City, however, QJP was advised that it should 
not file a joint petition with Barnes Bank because Park City was going to reject the 
annexation of the Barnes Bank property and QJP's petition would also be rejected if it 
filed a joint petition with Barnes. (R. 154-155, ^ 74). 
52. Park City also advised QJP that the reason it annexed only a small 
peninsula of its own land on the northeast border of the QJP Property on October 21, 
2004 was to avoid annexing the Barnes Bank property. (R. 154-155, ffl[ 68, 75). 
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53. QJP was further advised that if it filed a separate petition, Park City would 
accept the petition and annex the QJP Property into the City (R. 155, <[] 76). 
54. QJP advised Barnes Bank of this fact and the parties agreed to separate 
their joint petition and file amended, separate petitions. (R. 155, ^  77). 
55. Barnes Bank, a/k/a Park City Heights, then sent Park City a letter of 
protest. (R. 155, % 78; see also Exhibit 24). 
56. On or about January 24, 2005, QJP and Barnes Bank, a/k/a Park City 
Heights filed separate annexation petitions, which contained the same proposed per acre 
development and densities. (R. 155, ^ | 79; see also Exhibits 25-26). 
57. On March 10, 2005, Park City held a brief hearing and considered both 
annexation petitions (R 155,1[ 80; see also Exhibit 27) 
58. On March 10, 2005, before the annexation hearing, the Park City staff 
submitted a positive recommendation regarding annexation of the QJP Property. (R. 
156, U 83(b); see also Exhibit 30). 
59. During the March 10, 2005 hearing, however, Park City unanimously 
accepted the Barnes Bank petition and denied the QJP petition by a vote of three to two. 
(R. 155,^80-82). 
60. The first reason for the denial stated in the hearing was the potential for 
"the creation of [an] island, or, at a minimum, a peninsula" due to certain adjacent land 
owned by the Osguthorpe family. (Exhibit 28, p. 7). 
61. The alleged island or peninsula, however (the Osguthorpe parcel) arose 
because Park City deliberately annexed only a portion of a parcel it owned adjacent to 
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the QJP Property, and failed to include all contiguous city-owned property within that 
annexation as required by State law. (R. 157, ^ 86(a)). Park City's strategic annexation 
of its own property artificially created the technical issues of contiguity, peninsulas and 
islands.6 (R. 159, ^ 86(k)). 
62. In addition, the owner of the Osguthorpe parcel which allegedly created the 
peninsula caused a letter to be sent to Park City on March 8, 2005, informing Park City 
that he was unow willing to consider inclusion of the trust property in the proposed 
annexation" of the QJP Property and Barnes Bank property. (R. 158-159, J^ 86(j); see 
also Exhibit 29). 
63. Another reason stated in the hearing for the rejection of the QJP Petition 
was that the "proposed design" was incompatible with the "spirit" of the City's General 
Plan (the "QJ Study" referenced above in Paragraph 43). (Exhibit 28, p. 8). 
64. The annexation petition submitted by Barnes Bank and approved by Park 
City, however, was nearly identical to the annexation petition and development proposed 
by QJP, including the same per acre development and densities. (R. 155, 157, fflj 79, 
86(c); see also Exhibits 25-26). 
65. There is no legitimate basis for Park City to differentiate the Barnes Bank 
property from the QJP Property based on a prior pre-annexation agreement, dated July 2, 
In addition, the creation of so-called peninsulas through annexation does not generally 
prevent Park City annexations. For example, about eight months prior to the denial of 
QJP's annexation petition, Park City annexed two separate properties in the Quinn's 
Junction area that both created similar peninsulas. (R. 157, ffl[ 86(a), (b)). Both 
properties are currently undergoing commercial development. (Id.) 
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1992, between Park City and Barnes' predecessor because by its terms, the Barnes Bank 
property was subject to the same current land use regulations as the QJP Property and the 
Barnes' petition included property owners that did not have pre-annexation agreements. 
(R. 158,1186(h)). 
66. On March 13, 2005, three days after the annexation hearing, the Mayor of 
Park City called Ralph Merrill and again offered to buy the QJP Property to be used as 
open space. Merrill declined. (R. 156, ^ | 83(e)). 
67. One day later, on March 14, 2005, Park City issued a formal notice of 
rejection of QJP's annexation petition, without giving any reason. (R. 156, ^ 83(f); see 
also Exhibit 32). The formal notice also contained outright errors, including the 
statement that the vote against annexation was 5-0 when in reality it was 3-2. (See 
io^rU:uu no ~~ n i n . ~ 1~~ r?^u;u:+ o o \ 
JUA111UII Z.O, p p . 7 - 1 U , 5CC CUSU J^AlllUll J J). 
68. On March 19, 2005, the Park City Mayor issued the following statement to 
the press: 
There is land along Park City's S.R. 248 entry-way that could 
be purchased with revenues from another bond. At this point 
that's the place that's still open and probably faces the greatest 
threat from development. 
(R. 156, % 83(h); see also Exhibit 34). 
69. Upon information and belief, the QJP Property is the land on the S.R. 248 
entry-way that the mayor referred to in his comments to the press. (R. 156-157, |^ 84). 
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70. Park City used subjective, vague, ambiguous, and unlawful criteria to 
reject QJP's petition including the QJ Study which the Court should declare void or 
illegal pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 10-9a-801(3). (R. 159, ] 86(m)). 
71. Park City used land regulation to acquire QJP's property as open space 
without just compensation and due process. (R. 159, ^ j 86(n)). 
72. Park City did not apply the law equally to QJP and other similarly situated 
properties as required by its own municipal ordinances and the Utah State Constitution. 
(R. 159,U86(o)). 
73. Even though the QJP Property is not within Park City's boundaries, Park 
City has and is exercising land use control over the Property, and is refusing to allow any 
economically viable use of the Property to proceed. (R. 160,1j 88). 
74. Park City's exercise of control over the QJP Property, together with its 
refusal to annex the QJP Property or approve any development thereon, has left QJP with 
no economically viable use for the property. (R. 161-162, U 94). 
75. In addition, Park City has deprived QJP of its reasonable investment-
backed expectations for the QJP Property, based on the commercial land prices and taxes 
paid by QJP, as well as the various fees and other expenses it has incurred as a result of 
representations by and requirements of Park City. (R. 162,1f 95). 
76. Park City's refusal to annex the QJP Property or allow any economically 
viable use does not substantially advance any legitimate public interest, nor is it 
reasonably related or narrowly tailored to any such interest. (R. 162, ^ 96). 
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77. QJP has exhausted its administrative remedies, Park City has waived any 
such requirement, or it would be futile for QJP to take further action in this regard. (R. 
162,197). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
This action is the result of Park City's efforts for Ihe past fifteen (15) years to 
preclude development on the QJP Property and to maintain that property as open space 
for the benefit of Park City without payment of just compensation. The QJP Property lies 
in Summit County, outside the boundaries of Park City. Nonetheless, when QJP 
petitioned Summit County to reinstate a commercial zone on the QJP Property in 1993, 
after a downzoning from commercial to base density, QJP was informed that it could not 
obtain any development for the QJP Property without approval and annexation by Park 
City. That requirement arose from the QJP Property being located within Park City's 
annexation declaration zone and being covered by interlocal agreements between Summit 
County and Park City giving Park City control over the property. 
For the last fifteen (15) years, up to and including the present time, Park City has 
imposed one obstacle after another to block QJP's efforts to obtain an economically 
viable use for the QJP Property. Because the QJP Property was not contiguous to Park 
City until October, 2004, QJP spent the years from 1993 through 2004 seeking 
development approval from both Summit County and Park City without annexation. 
Following a determination of vested rights by Summit County in 1995, and several 
changes to Park City's General Plan, in 1998 Summit County designated the QJP 
Property as a possible village center. As a precondition to obtaining approval for any 
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such development, however, QJP was required to organize the neighboring landowners 
and craft a Master Plan, along with obtaining the approval of Park City, for the Quinn's 
Junction area. QJP was thwarted in those efforts, however, first by Park City's strategic 
land purchases in the area, and then by Park City's 1999 decision not to approve any 
development before the 2002 Winter Olympics. Park City then made its first inquiry to 
QJP regarding purchasing the QJP Property for open space, after having depressed the 
price by consistently precluding any development for years before and into the 
foreseeable future. 
The completion of the Winter Olympics brought only further delay for QJP, as 
Park City then blocked all development efforts pending the completion of a three-year 
land-use study at Quinn's Junction. When the outside expert retained by Park City and 
Summit County to conduct the study reached conclusions adverse to Park City's 
intentions, Park City fired the expert, disregarded his findings, and crafted its own report. 
During the lengthy study moratorium, the QJP Property became contiguous to 
Park City's boundaries for the first time. QJP then dutifully obtained a pre-annexation 
agreement from Park City and filed its petition for annexation. Inexplicably, in spite of 
the pre-annexation agreement and representations by Park City that the QJP Petition 
would be favored, Park City denied QJP's petition. Park City's simultaneous approval of 
a nearly identical petition filed by an adjacent landowner revealed that Park City's stated 
reasons for the QJP denial, including the creation of a peninsula and incompatibility with 
Park City's land-use study, were pretextual and false. After the denial of QJP's 
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annexation petition, Park City made another offer to buy the QJP Property as open space 
at depressed prices, revealing the true purpose of its annexation decision. 
A municipality's decision regarding an annexation petition is generally entitled to 
deference from the courts, unless the facts demonstrate that the decision was "arbitrary, 
capricious, or illegal," or tainted by an abuse of power or fraud. QJP has clearly made 
the factual allegations necessary to establish that Park City's decision is subject to the 
Court's review pursuant to the standards set forth by the Utah Appellate Courts. The 
facts show that Park City has abused its annexation power and its authority under the 
interlocal agreements with Summit County to obstruct any and all efforts by QJP to 
obtain an economically viable use for the QJP Property. As set forth in greater detail 
below. Park City has imposed one delay and obstruction after another for the purpose of 
p f A r » « i « A o i l n<a i7a lnr» tv»a«+ /-\T + V» <r» f l TO Ty-*r\-r\£±i~4"\T + /-* -hi*»fV»o*« i f p r\-r\c*f\ ot-%or»c» n r t a n n o T n i c r » o o o 
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presents an "unjust" situation demanding judicial review. 
Park City denied QJP's annexation petition for the purpose of precluding all 
development on the property, and either maintaining the property in its current 
undeveloped state or obtaining the property for open space at an artificially depressed 
price. The allegations of QJP's Revised Second Amended Complaint, when viewed 
under the standard applicable to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, state a valid claim 
that Park City's annexation decision, in the context of Park City's conduct for the past 
fifteen (15) years, was arbitrary, capricious, or illegal. In addition, the allegations 
regarding Park City's actions and intent to preclude any development by abusing its 
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annexation power and interlocal agreements with Summit County, if established at trial, 
state a valid claim for inverse condemnation of the QJP Property. 
ARGUMENT 
I. The Deference to be Afforded Park City's Annexation Decision Does 
Not Prevent Judicial Review of Park City's Arbitrary, Capricious, and 
Illegal Motives, Purposes, and Actions in this Case. 
The Utah Supreme Court has stated that "[a] determination of city boundaries is a 
legislative function. . . [for which] courts are reluctant to interfere." Child v. Spanish 
Fork, 538 P.2d 184, 186 (Utah 1975) (citing Bradshaw v. Beaver City, 493 P.2d 643 
(Utah 1972)). However, the Supreme Court has also unequivocally affirmed the courts' 
authority and duty to intervene where "the decisions or actions taken . . . are so wholly 
unreasonable and unjust that they must be deemed capricious and arbitrary in adversely 
a i i v v u i i g , o u i i i v u i i v o ng i iLO. v^iniyi, ^~>o i .^\u a t 1 OVJ, OV^ V^  a u u l v i c y u n i a u I V I U H . v^v^ip. 
§7.41 (2007) ("Since the change of municipal boundaries is regarded as a legislative 
question . . . [the municipality's] decision is final as to the existence of the facts in the 
absence of abuse of power or fraud) (emphasis added); Utah Code Ann. § 10-9a-801(3) 
(2007) (court shall determine whether municipality's land use decision is "arbitrary, 
capricious, and illegal."). 
In Creekside Associates, Inc. v. City of Wood Dale, 684 F. Supp. 201 (N.D. 111. 
1988), the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois confronted a similar 
claim to that of QJP in this case. In Creekside, the plaintiffs could not obtain 
development permits for their property without first being annexed into the defendant 
city. Id. at 203. Plaintiffs submitted a plan and annexation proposal to the City, which 
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was originally accepted by the Planning Commission before being summarily rejected by 
the City Council. Id. Plaintiffs "alleged that Wood Dale's refusal to annex and 
appropriately zone the property" was arbitrary and capricious because it "bore no 
relationship to public policy and served no legitimate public interest." Id. at 205. The 
defendant city moved to dismiss, but the court ruled that: 
While plaintiffs' burden of proving the absence of any legitimate 
justification for Wood Dale's decision may be difficult, we cannot conclude 
on the face of the complaint that a trier of fact could not find that Wood 
Dale's failure to annex and zone the parcel for development in compliance 
with the Wood Dale plan was arbitrary and capricious. On this basis alone, 
Plaintiffs have stated a cognizable claim. 
Id 
The facts are more compelling in this case. QJP entered into a pre-annexation 
agreement with Park City on May 14, 2004, and the Park City Council on March 10, 
2005 arbitrarily and capriciously reneged on that agreement and rejected QJP's 
annexation petition. Moreover, as explained in more detail below, Park City rejected 
QJP's annexation petition as just one action in an ongoing course of conduct carried out 
for the pre-determined purpose of precluding all development and either obtaining the 
QJP Property for open-space at an artificially depressed price, or maintaining the QJP 
Property in its current, undeveloped state. The pre-determined reasons for Park City's 
conduct, including the denial of the annexation petition, as alleged by QJP and accepted 
as true for purposes of this appeal, serve no legitimate public interest. 
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II. Park City Is and Has Been Abusing its Annexation Power to Obtain 
Open Space Without Paying Just Compensation by Preventing AH 
Development and Either Maintaining the Property in its Undeveloped 
State or Obtaining the Property at an Artificially Depressed Price. 
QJP has made diligent efforts since the early 1990's to obtain approval for an 
economically viable use of the QJP Property. Park City and Summit County, however, 
have imposed one obstacle and delay after another to thwart those efforts. When QJP 
purchased the thirty (30) acres comprising the QJP Property at commercial prices in 
1990, it was the only property designated as a hard zone commercial node in the area. 
(R. 141, U 8). In 1993, the QJP Property was down-zoned to one (1) unit per forty (40) 
acres. (R. 142, f^ 14). In response to the down-zoning, QJP filed an application with 
Summit County to reinstate the commercial zone. (R. 142, ^ 15). The application was 
denied, and Summit County directed QJP to seek all future development approvals from 
Park City, because interlocal agreements between Park City and Summit County gave 
Park City control over development decisions on the QJP Property . (R. 142, ^ 15). 
In 1995, Summit County heard QJP's claim that it possessed a vested right in 
certain development permits on the QJP Property. (R. 145, <| 28). In the vested rights 
hearing, Summit County, through its planning department, agreed to restore the previous 
commercial use to the QJP Property, by designating the QJP Property 'commercial' in its 
general land use plan. On March 18, 1996, Park City also recognized the restored 
commercial zoning of the QJP Property, designating the property as commercial on its 
draft land-use maps and General Plan. In or about March 1996, however, Summit 
County refused to restore the commercial zone. (R. 147, ^ 37). On March 20, 1997, 
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Park City also adopted a new General Plan designating the QJP Property as only a 
"possible commercial receiving zone." (R. 145, ffl| 30-31; see also Exhibit 8). 
QJP continued to seek a reinstatement of the commercial zone, and in 1998, 
Summit County placed a possible village center zone on the QJP Property. (R. 147, If 
39). As a precondition to any development application, however, Park City and Summit 
County directed QJP to organize all property owners within the Park City annexation 
declaration zone to prepare a master plan and annexation petition. (R. 148, ]^ 41). QJP 
accordingly worked diligently to do so from 1998 through May 1999, while Park City 
simultaneously sought to undermine those efforts through strategic land purchases from 
landowners that QJP had been directed to organize. (R. 149, f 47). In or about May, 
1999, Ralph Merrill was advised that Park City would not annex or approve any 
development until after the 2002 Winter Olympics. (R. 148, <[<{ 42-43). Thus, in May 
1999, having precluded development of the QJP Property for six years and having 
announced their intention to continue to delay any development for at least three more, 
Park City, through its citizen group COS AC, sent QJP a letter inquiring about a possible 
sale of the QJP Property to Park City as open space. (R. 149, TJ 46). QJP declined the 
offer. 
After the 2002 Winter Olympics, QJP approached Park City and Summit County 
again about annexing and developing the QJP Property, as both the City's and County's 
land use maps indicated at least a possible commercial zone for the property. (R. 149, 
^ 48). In response, Park City informed QJP that no development would take place until 
the completion of another land use study for Quinn's Junction. (Id.) This study took 
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three (3) years to complete, in part because the first consultant hired by Park City and 
Summit County, Steve Coyle, made several determinations that were adverse to Park 
City's and Summit County's interests. (R. 150, 152, ffl[ 50, 58). 
Mr. Coyle concluded that: (a) Quinn's Junction was an acceptable location for 
commercial development, and (b) Park City's and Summit County's opaque and 
discretionary land-use regulations, either intentionally or unintentionally, enabled Park 
City to inequitably acquire property for open space at artificially depressed prices. (R. 
151, T| 56; see also Exhibit 19, p. 2). Mr. Coyle stated as follows in his report: 
While the purchase of land in the area as open space may be a stated goal of 
both City and County officials, intentionally or unintentionally relying on a 
discretionary code system to effectively reduce property values may result 
in a less equitable means to achieve this end. 
(Id.) Following the issuance of this critical report, Mr. Coyle was promptly fired and 
the report buried. (R. 152, f^ 61). 
Park City and Summit County then prepared their own report, contradicting that of 
the independent expert, Mr. Coyle. (R. 153, TJ 63). As the study dragged on, a property 
owner adjacent to the QJP Property declared bankruptcy due to the deadlock. (R. 150, 
K 50). Park City purchased that property and has maintained it as open space to this day. 
In October 2004, Park City annexed a portion of the adjacent property, making the 
QJP Property contiguous to Park City, and thus potentially annexable, for the first time. 
(R. 154, U 68). Accordingly, with the previously insurmountable obstacle to development 
lifted, QJP and another adjacent property owner, Barnes Bank, filed a joint petition for 
annexation into Park City. (R. 154, ^ 70). During a subsequent meeting with Park City, 
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however, QJP was advised to file its own separate annexation petition because QJP's 
petition was favored by Park City while Barnes Bank's petition was not. (R. 154-155, 
TI 74). Accordingly, QJP and Barnes Bank separated their petitions, but maintained the 
same joint commercial master plan including the same per acre development and 
densities. (R. 155, ^ 79). 
At the annexation hearing on March 10, 2005, contrary to its prior statements, 
Park City unanimously accepted Barnes Bank's petition and denied QJP's petition by a 
vote of three to two. (R. 155, ^ | 81-82). One day after issuing the formal denial of QJP's 
petition and once again precluding development for the foreseeable future, Park City 
again offered to purchase the QJP Property for open space at depressed prices. (R. 156, 
f 83(e)). QJP again declined The following day, the mayor of Park City issued a press 
l c iwaov Diaung tnai i a n u a iwug i aiiv ^ i i y d o . iv . ^ t o tuny- way, IIJYC; u i c v</j± i l u p c n ^ , 
should be purchased with open space funds because it "face[d] the greatest threat from 
development." (R. 156, ^ 83(h); see also Exhibit 34). 
According to these facts, Park City is exercising regulatory control over the QJP 
Property pursuant to its interlocal agreements with Summit County, and is exercising that 
control to preclude any economically viable use of the QJP Property. "A reviewing court 
may not inquire into the motives of municipal authorities or others with respect to 
annexation or detachment of municipal areas, unless the proceedings are tainted by 
malice, fraud, corruption, or gross abuse of discretion." McQuillan Mun. Corp. §7.41 
(2007) (emphasis added). The facts in this case establish that Park City has grossly 
abused its discretion in refusing to annex or approve any use of the QJP Property for the 
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purpose of precluding any development and obtaining the property as open space either 
without payment of just compensation or at an extortionate price. It is difficult to 
imagine a more tainted proceeding. 
The trial court erred, and disregarded the facts, when it ruled that "[a]t best, 
plaintiff has claimed a pattern of conduct that does not allow land owners to fully utilize 
their land." (R. 238). That characterization ignores the 15-year history of Park City's 
abuses, including repeated moratoria, false statements, and the culminating denial of the 
annexation petition, all of which have not just precluded QJP from "fully utilizing]" its 
property but have precluded any use at all. The actions of Park City, as alleged, are "so 
wholly discordant to reason and justice that [they] must be deemed capricious and 
arbitrarv and thus in violation of comnlainant's riehts." Triangle Oil v. North Salt Lake 
r^™ /;no P "M m o n/if> m+oU ioem HTP'C Do+;t; O l 71 O i l 7 r%T 
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conduct should not have been dismissed and the trial court's decision must be reversed. 
III. Park City's Improper and Abusive Exercise Of Its Regulatory and 
Annexation Powers Resulted In An Inverse Condemnation of the QJP 
Property. 
In its Revised Second Amended Complaint and Petition, QJP has properly asserted 
a claim for inverse condemnation. Article I, § 22 of the Utah Constitution provides that 
"[p]rivate property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just 
compensation." "This provision is broader in its language than the similar provision in 
the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution." Bagford v. Ephraim City, 904 
P.2d 1095, 1097 (Utah 1995). An inverse condemnation action requires "(1) property, 
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(2) a taking or damages, and (3) a public use." Farmers New World Life Ins. Co. v. 
Bountiful City, 803 P.2d 1241, 1243-44 (Utah 1990). Accordingly: 
[t]he takings analysis has two principal steps: First, the claimant must 
demonstrate some 'protectible interest in property.' If the claimant 
possesses a protectible property interest, the claimant must then show that 
the interest has been 'taken or damaged' by government action. A 'taking' 
is 'any substantial interference with private property which destroys or 
materially lessens its value, or by which the owner's right to its use and 
enjoyment is in any substantial degree abridged or destroyed.' 
Strawberry Elec. Sery. Dist. v. Spanish Fork City, 918 P.2d 870, 877 (Utah 1996) 
(citations omitted). 
A. QJP Has A Protectible Property Interest. 
The trial court improperly ruled that "simply because plaintiff may have certain 
expectations about its property does not equate to a vested property interest affected by 
rXJoyly P i h r c l o n n a v o f i n n n o ^ i o i n n " (X) 0 /1 1 \ Tl-»£» o v « a o + o f i A t i r / • TD h o c rVv-t* i + o -r\irr\-r\c*iri~%. T 
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however, are simply the expectations commensurate with fee simple ownership of any 
real property - the expectation that the fee simple owner be allowed to put the property to 
some economically viable use. The facts demonstrate that Park City has not merely 
precluded QJP from "fully utilize[ing] their land," as found by the trial court, it has 
effectively deprived QJP of any_ economically viable use through the abuse of its 
annexation power and interlocal agreements. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council 
505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992) (payment of just compensation required where restriction 
denies all economically beneficial or productive use of the land); Penn Central 
Transportation Co. v. City of New York 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) (regulation that causes 
diminution in value or interferes with reasonable investment-backed expectations may 
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constitute a taking requiring payment of just compensation); Arnell v. Salt Lake County 
Bd. of Adjustment, 2005 UT App 165, ^ 17, 112 P.3d 1214 (analyzing takings claim 
through extent of regulatory restriction and interference with investment-backed 
expectations). Because annexation and Park City approval is a required precondition to 
any development on the QJP Property, QJP's expectations with respect to annexation are 
reasonable and protectible. Accordingly, QJP has established, for purposes of the motion 
to dismiss, that it has a protectible property interest for purpose of its inverse 
condemnation claim. 
Moreover, QJP has a recognized property interest in the commercial rights in the 
QPJ property, as set forth in its Revised Second Amended Complaint as follows: 
The County, through its planning department, agreed to restore the previous 
commercial use to the QJP Property by designating the QJP Property 
'commercial' in its general land use plan. On March 18, 1996 the City7 also 
recognized the restored commercial zoning of the QJP Property, 
designating the property as commercial on its maps. Those actions were 
taken, in part, because, in a hearing on August 29, 1995, the Summit 
County Commission found QJP had vested commercial rights in the QJP 
Property and directed the County Planning Commission to restore a 
commercial hard zone to the QJP Property. 
(R. 145, H 128; see also Exhibit 6). 
B. Park City's Refusal to Permit Development and to Annex the 
QJP Property Can and Does Constitute A Regulatory Taking or 
Inverse Condemnation. 
The trial court erred when it found that "Park City's Council decision placed no [] 
restriction on plaintiffs use of his property." (R. 242). As alleged by QJP, Park City's 
acts, pursuant to its interlocal agreements with Summit County, not only restrict but 
preclude QJP's use of its property for any economically viable purpose. 
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Regulatory takings "occur when a governmental entity intrudes to limit the use of 
private property while not physically seizing it." B.A.M. Development L.L.C. v. Salt 
Lake County, 2005 UT 89, ^ 33, 541 Utah Adv. Rep. 3. "[Z]oning regulations are a 
typical form of regulatory taking." Id, 
The Supreme Court has assigned no set formula to determine whether a 
regulatory taking is unconstitutional. Although there is no set formula, the 
Court has 'examined the taking question by engaging in essentially ad hoc, 
factual inquiries that have identified several factors - such as economic 
impact of the regulation, its interference with reasonable investment-backed 
expectations, and the character of the government action.' Each regulatory 
taking stands on its own and must be examined individually to determine 
whether it 'substantially advances legitimate state interests' and 'does not 
deny an owner economically viable use of his land.' 
Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added). "A regulatory taking transpires when some 
significant restriction is placed upon an owner's use of his property for which 'justice and 
l U l l l l C ' O O l V C J t l l l V 111UL W l l l p V / l l O t l L l V S l i 17W g l V V l l . V 1VVV V>V^A1VAL/ W Y 1 1 W 1 J i l .OOV»V/. V. J. TAU ± V^ W , 
LLC, 2005 UT 91,131, 127 P.3d 697 (citations omitted). 
The analysis set forth in the Creekside case is again relevant and persuasive, and 
contradicts the trial court's ruling that a decision not to annex property cannot restrict the 
use of that property. Creekside Associates, Inc., 684 F. Supp. at 201. In Creekside, the 
U.S. District Court concluded that "plaintiffs have also stated a cognizable claim by 
alleging that the City Council's decision [not to annex] deprived them of all use of their 
property without compensation." Id. at 205. "A municipality cannot without 
compensation deprive a property owner of all reasonable uses of the property even if such 
deprivation serves a legitimate public interest." Id. (emphasis added). Thus, the refusal 
to annex and approve the development plan can serve as the underlying act supporting a 
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takings claim. "By alleging that the City Council's decision rendered their property 
worthless, plaintiffs have stated a claim upon which relief may be granted and thereby 
survived [the] motion to dismiss." Id. 
This is precisely what QJP has alleged here - that in refusing to approve 
development and annex the QJP Property, when annexation and approval by Park City 
are requirements for development, Park City has deprived QJP of any economically 
viable use for the property. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1025 (2002); Arnell 2005 UT App 165 at 
H 17. In addition, Park City has deprived QJP of its reasonable investment-backed 
expectations for the QJP Property, based on the commercial land prices and taxes paid by 
QJP, as well as the various fees and other expenses it has incurred as a result of 
representations by Park City officials. (R. 162. If 95). Penn Central Transportation Co., 
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open-space is a legitimate public interest, that interest cannot be legally pursued through 
deliberate actions depriving QJP of all economically feasible uses for its property without 
payment of just compensation. 
Summit County has ceded to Park City the decision making authority over 
development of the QJP Property. Park City has, in turn, abusively exercised its 
regulatory and annexation power in a manner designed to preclude all economically 
viable uses for the QJP Property. Park City has done so because it desires to maintain the 
QJP Property as open space, either without payment of any just compensation or by 
payment of a price severely depressed by the fact that it will never allow the property to 
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be developed The facts as alleged set forth a \ - ciaim that Park City's actions 
constitute a regulatory taking or inverse condemnation. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, this Coin! should reverse flic trul couil \ order 
dismissing this case. 
DATED this 20th day of October, 2008. 
Van Cott, Bagley, Cornwc il 1 & 1\ 1 cC; u If :iy 
Scott M. Lilja 
Chandler P. Thompson 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 7 Appellant Ralph Merrill d/b/a 
Quinn 's Junction Partnership 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused two (2) true and correct copies of the within and 
foregoing BRIEI . iv hand-delivered, this 20th day of October, 
2008, to the following: 
Mark D. Harrington 
Polly Samuels McLean 
Park City Attorney 
445 Marsac Avenue 
Park City, UT 84060 
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§ 10-9a-801. No district court review until administrative remedies exhausted — Time for 
filing -- Tolling of time — Standards governing court review — Record on review — Staying of 
decision 
(1) No person may challenge in district court a municipality's land use decision made under 
this chapter, or under a regulation made under authority of this chapter, until that person 
has exhausted the person's administrative remedies as provided in Part 7, Appeal Authority 
and Variances, if applicable. 
(2) (a) Any person adversely affected by a final decision made in the exercise of or in 
violation of the provisions of this chapter may file a petition for review of the decision with 
the district court within 30 days after the local land use decision is f inal. 
(b) (i) The time under Subsection (2)(a) to file a petition is tolled from the date a property 
owner files a request for arbitration of a constitutional taking issue with the property rights 
ombudsman under Section 13-43-204 until 30 days after: 
(AJ t r ' i nnal award; or 
(B) the property rights ombudsman issues a written statement under Subsection 13-
43-204(3)(b) declining to arbitrate or to appoint an arbitrator, 
(ii) A tolling under Subsection (2)(b)( i) operates only as to the specific constitutional 
taking issue that is the subject of the request for arbitration filed with the property rights 
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ombudsman by a property owner. 
(iii) A request for arbitration filed with the property rights ombudsman after the t ime 
under Subsection (2)(a) to file a petition has expired does not affect the time to file a 
petition. 
(3) (a) The courts shall: 
(i) presume that a decision, ordinance, or regulation made under the authority of this 
chapter is valid; and 
(ii) determine only whether or not the decision, ordinance, or regulation is arbitrary, 
capricious, or illegal. 
(b) A decision, ordinance, or regulation involving the exercise of legislative discretion is 
valid if it is reasonably debatable that the decision, ordinance, or regulation promotes the 
purposes of this chapter and is not otherwise illegal. 
(c) A final decision of a land use authority or an appeal authority is valid if the decision is 
supported by substantial evidence in the record and is not arbitrary, capricious, or illegal. 
(d) A determination of illegality requires a determination that the decision, ordinance, or 
regulation violates a law, statute, or ordinance in effect at the time the decision was made or 
the ordinance or regulation adopted. 
(4) The provisions of Subsection (2)(a) apply from the date on which the municipality takes 
final action on a land use application for any adversely affected third party, if the municipality 
conformed with the notice provisions of Part 2, Notice, or for any person who had actual 
notice of the pending decision. 
(5) If the municipality has complied with Section 10-9a-205, a challenge to the enactment of 
a land use ordinance or general plan may not be filed with the district court more than 30 
days after the enactment. 
(6) The petition is barred unless it is filed within 30 days after the appeal authority's decision 
is f inal. 
(7) (a) The land use authority or appeal authority, as the case may be, shall transmit to the 
reviewing court the record of its proceedings, including its minutes, findings, orders, and, if 
available, a true and correct transcript of its proceedings. 
(b) I f the proceeding was tape recorded, a transcript of that tape i ecor dh ig is a ti ue ai id 
correct transcript for purposes of this Subsection (7). 
(8) (a) (i) If there is a record, the district court's review is limited to the record provided by 
the land use authority or appeal authority, as the case may be. 
(ii) The court may not accept or consider any evidence outside the record of the land use 
authority or appeal authority, as the case may be, unless that evidence was offered to the 
land use authority or appeal authority, respectively, and the court determines that it was 
improperly excluded. 
(b) I f there is no record, the court may call witnesses and take evidence. 
(9) (a) The filing of a petition does not stay the decision of the laiid use authority or authority 
appeal authority, as the case may be. 
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(b) (i) Before filing a petition under this section or a request for mediation or arbitration of 
a constitutional taking issue under Section 13-43-204, the aggrieved party may petition the 
appeal authority to stay its decision. 
(ii) Upon receipt of a petition to stay, the appeal authority may order its decision stayed 
pending district court review if the appeal authority finds it to be in the best interest of the 
municipality, 
(iii) After a petition is filed under this section or a request for mediation or arbitration of 
a constitutional taking issue is filed under Section 13-43-204, the petitioner may seek an 
injunction staying the appeal authority's decision. 
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ADDENDUM 2 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
RALPH MERRILL clba QUINN'S 
JUNCTION PARTNERSHIP, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
PARK CITY, 
Defendant. 
RULING and ORDER 
Case No. 050500205 
Judge BRUCE C. LUBECK 
DATE: April 22, 2008 
The above matter came before the court for oral argument on 
April 18, 2008 on defendant's motion to dismiss. 
The motion was filed February 15, 2008. Plaintiff opposed the 
motion March 6, 2008, and defendant replied in support March 13, 
2008. Defendant filed a request to submit on March 13, 2008. Based 
thereon oral argument was scheduled but postponed at the request of 
the parties. 
Plaintiff was present through Scott Lilja and defendant was 
present through Mark Harrington. 
Oral argument was held and the court took the issues under 
advisement. Before the hearing the court carefully considered the 
memoranda and other materials submitted by the parties. Since 
taking the issues under advisement, the court has further 
considered the law and facts relating to the issues. Now being 
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fulli advised, the court renders the following Ruling and Order. 
DISCUSSION 
UA rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss admits the facts alleged 
in the complaint but challenges the plaintiff's right to relief 
based on those facts." St. Benedict 's Dev. Co. v. St. Benedict 's 
Hosp., 811 P.2d 194 (Utah 1991). On a motion to dismiss the court 
accepts the material allegations in the complaint as true and 
interprets those facts and all reasonable inferences drawn 
therefrom in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. 
Moss v. Pete Suazo Utah Ath. Comm'n, 2007 UT 99, IS. Granting a 
motion to dismiss "denies the nonmoving party of the right to 
litigate his claim on the merits, [and] the threshold for 
surviving such a motion is relatively low. Anderson Dev. Co. v. 
Tobias, 2005 UT 36, 549. "Only if it is clear that the claimant 
is not entitled to relief under any state of facts that could be 
proven to support the claim should a motion to dismiss be 
granted." Buckner v. Kennard, 2004 UT 78, 19. 
Plaintiff sets forth many allegations in the revised "second 
amended petition for review; complaint for declaratory relief and 
damages and jury demand'' in which it asks the court to review the 
Park City Denial of QJP Annexation Petition and makes claims for 
declaratory judgment, inverse condemnation and damages. 
-2-
A. PETITION FOR REVIEW. 
Plaintiff claims that the Council's land use decision, voted 
on March 10, 2005 and recorded in writing March 14, 2005, in a 
letter from Park City's Mayor, to reject plaintiff's annexation 
petition for Quinn's Junction Parcel (QJP), was arbitrary, 
capricious and illegal under UCA 10-9a-801(3) . Defendants claim 
plaintiff has no cause of action under this statute, that the 
Council's decision is not a land use decision, nor a taking nor 
did it amount to inverse condemnation. 
Plaintiff recites a litany of allegations, many of which 
concern decisions, agreements, and other matters that are not 
before the court in relation to plaintiff's petition for review, 
to show the history of defendant's arbitrary actions. The court 
focuses on those allegations pertinent to plaintiff's petition 
for review, which alleges the Park City Council's (the Council) 
decision was arbitrary and capricious. 
It is well established: 
[A] determination of city boundaries is a legislative 
function . . . . as in all legislative matters, courts 
are reluctant to interfere therewith; and do-so only 
when the decisions or actions taken are clearly outside 
the authority of the governing body, or are so wholly 
unreasonable and unjust that they must be deemed 
capricious and arbitrary in adversely affecting 
someone's rights. 
Child v. Spanish Fork, 538 P.2d 184, 186 (Utah 1975)(citing 
Bradshaw v. Beaver City, 27 Utah 2d 135, 138 (Utah 1972)). The 
Utah Municipal Code states the powers delegated to a municipality 
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by statute "shall be liberally construed to permit the 
municipality to exercise the powers granted by this act except in 
cases clearly contrary to the intent of the law." UCA 10-1-103). 
2. The Council's Decision was a Land Use Decision. 
Defendant claims the Council's decision was not a land use 
decision and therefore that plaintiff has no case of action under 
UCA 10-9a-801 (3) . The basic position of defendant is that the 
decision by a municipality to NOT annex is not reviewable in 
court. Defendant cites Chevron U.S.A. v. North Salt Lake, 711 
P.2d 228 (Utah 1985) to support this claim. However, in the 
citation they point to from this case, the Court acknowledges 
that the former annexation statute "contemplates that residents 
of an annexed area may challenge the annexation in court although 
the act does not specify a particular kind of judicial procedure 
for such a challenge." (at 231). This does not mean, as 
defendants urge, that a City Council's annexation decision is not 
a land use decision. Bradshaw v Beaver City, 2493 P. 2d 643 (UT 
19.72) seems to indicate that the decision to annex, is a 
legislative function and the courts may review such decision, but 
with great reluctance to intrude into the prerogative of that 
legislative branch and the courts will interfere if the decision 
is so lacking in propriety and reason that it must be deemed 
capricious and arbitrary. Further, under MLUDMA, "any person 
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adversely affected by a final decision made in the exercise of or 
in violation of the provisions of this chapter may file a 
petition for review of the decision with the district court 
within 30 days after the local land use decision is final." UCA 
10-9a-801 (2) (a)) . The Council's decision to reject an annexation 
petition was made, m this court's view, in the exercise of the 
provisions of The "Municipal Land Use, Development, and 
Management Act" (MLUDMA). 
The decision to NOT annex seems to be reviewable in court 
under the legislative review provision, UCA 10-9a-801(3) (b) . The 
court looks at a legislative land use decision to see if it is 
reasonably debatable. The court does not substitute its judgment 
for that of the legislative body. If the decision could promote 
the general welfare or even if it is reasonable debatable that it 
is in the interest of the general welfare, the decision is to be 
upheld. 
2. The Court Must Presume the Decision is Valid. 
In Utah, "annexation is a statutory procedure . . . .A city 
satisfies the statutory requirements through ^substantial 
compliance' with the statute. . . . the city [has] . . .broad 
discretion when making decisions which it concludes best fulfills 
its responsibility for determining municipal boundaries. 
Szatkowski v. Bountiful City, 906 P.2d 902, 904 (UT App 
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1995) (discussing a prior version of an annexation 
statute)(citations omitted). In reviewing a petition for 
rehearing, the court "shall presume that a decision, ordinance, 
or regulation made under the authority of this chapter is valid; 
and . . . determine only whether or not the decision, ordinance, 
or regulation is arbitrary, capricious, or illegal." (Id. at 10-
9a-801(3)). The statute sets out certain factors to guide a 
court's decision. (See Id. at (3)(b)-(d)). 
The court cannot conclude, even when presuming all of 
plaintiff's allegations to be true, that plaintiff could prevail 
in its assertion that the Council's March 2005 decision was 
illegal, capricious or arbitrary. At best, plaintiff has claimed 
a pattern of conduct that does not allow land owners to fully 
utilize their land. However, this does not equate to an illegal 
or arbitrary decision, and the court cannot see from the 
allegations and supporting evidence before it, how this decision 
could be viewed as such, as being not even reasonably debatable 
that it is in the general welfare. This is particularly so given 
the considerable deference owed to the Council's decision and the 
broad discretion the Council had to grant or deny plaintiff's 
petition. UCA 10-2-405(1) (a) (i) (A) . 
Plaintiff does not allege that the Council failed to adhere 
to statutory procedures in denying the petition, nor does 
plaintiff substantiate its claims that the Council's decision was 
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vague or ambiguous. 
Plaintiff's complaint fails to demonstrate that the 
Council's action was "outside of its authority or is so wholly 
discordant to reason and justice that its action must be deemed 
capricious and arbitrary and thus in violation of the 
complainant's rights." Triangle Oil v. North Salt Lake Corp., 609 
P.2d 1338, 1340 (Utah 1980). 
Plaintiff's complaint is dismissed, with prejudice, as to 
the first cause of action. The court has jurisdiction to 
entertain the petition but it fails to state a claim upon which 
relief can be granted. 
B. DECLARATORY JUDGMENT, INVERSE CONDEMNATION AND DAMAGES 
Plaintiff asks that the court grant declaratory judgment 
stating, "defendant has taken or damaged by inverse condemnation 
the QJP property without just compensation" and that the court 
award plaintiff fair market value for the QJP property. Defendant 
argues plaintiff does not have a property interest in the denial 
of an annexation petition to sustain a claim for inverse 
condemnation and the Council's decision had no affect on any such 
interest as plaintiff still owns the exact land it did prior to 
the Council's decision. Plaintiff responds that its protectible 
-7-
property interest was in the use and development of its propeity. 
The court's power to issue declaratory judgment is broad. 
UCA 78B-6-401. A plaintiff must first establish four threshold 
elements: "(1) a justiciable controversy, (2) parties whose 
interests are adverse, (3) a legally protectible interest 
residing with the party seeking relief, and (4) issues ripe for 
judicial determination." Miller v. Weaver, 2003 UT 12, 
SI15) (citations omitted) . However, just as the court has broad 
discretion to hear claims for declaratory relief, so too may it 
deny declaratory relief when it would not terminate the 
uncertainty or controversy. UCA 78B-6-404. The Declaratory 
Judgment Act, "'should be liberally construed, [but] the courts 
must, nevertheless, operate within the constitutional and 
statutory powers and duties imposed upon them. The courts are not 
a forum for hearing academic contentions or rendering advisory 
opinions.'" Utah Safe to Learn-Safe to Worship Coalitionf Inc. v. 
State, 94 P.3d 217, 224 (UT. 2004) (citations omitted). 
Defendants cite a North Dakota case to support the idea that 
u[d]eclaratory and injunctive relief are appropriate if a 
municipality fails to comply with the statutory procedures for 
annexation and zoning, but may not be used to test the wisdom of 
an annexation or zoning decision." Braunagel v. City of Devils 
Lake, 2001 ND 118, 112. However, the court may interfere with 
legislative decisions that are so unguided by wisdom as to be is 
-8-
capricious or arbitrary. Child, 538 P.2d 186. 
In an inverse condemnation action, if ''private property is 
taken or damaged for public use without a formal exercise of the 
eminent domain power, the property owner may bring an inverse 
condemnation action under article I, section 22 to recover the 
value of the property.'' Farmers New World Life Ins. Co. v. 
Bountiful City, 803 P.2d 1241, 1244 (Utah 1990). Despite 
dismissing plaintiff's petition for review of the denial of its 
annexation petition, the court can consider plaintiff's inverse 
condemnation claim under that provision of Utah's Constitution 
because it is self-executing. See Colman v. Utah State Land Bd., 
795 P.2d 622, 630-35 (Utah 1990). To sustain a claim for damages 
in an inverse condemnation action, plaintiff must establish "(1) 
orooertv. (2) a taking or damages, and (3) a public use." 
Farmers New World Life Ins. Co. v. Bountiful City, 803 P. 2d 1241, 
1244 (Utah 1990). 
Despite several court volumes of exhibits and 100 
allegations in its complaint, plaintiff's complaint fails to 
allege a basis for the court to conclude the Council's action 
could support a claim for inverse condemnation. Simply because 
plaintiff may have certain expectations about its property does 
not equate to a vested property interest affected by the 
Council's annexation decision. Plaintiff cites a California case 
to support an expansive view of property interests, despite the 
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states' dramatically different approaches to property rights. 
Plaintiff fails to establish why the court should equate 
plaintiff's fee simple interest in property with a vested 
interest in developing the property for maximum commercial gam, 
or at least pursuant to its commercial plan of use. Nor does the 
court see how its allegations of vested commercial rights as 
determined by the Summit County Commission affect the Park City 
Council's boundary determination, nor how that affects the 
court's determination of the issues in this case. 
As to the takings arm of the analysis, plaintiff's 
allegations do not support a regulatory takings claim. Park 
City's City Council made the determination NOT to annex 
plaintiff's property into the Park City boundaries. Plaintiff's 
land is in Summit County. "XA regulatory taking transpires when 
some significant restriction is placed upon an owner's use of his 
property for which 'justice and fairness' require that 
compensation be given.'" View Condo. Owners Ass'n v. MSICO, 
L.L.C., 2005 UT 91, 131 (internal citation omitted). Park City's 
Council placed no such restriction on plaintiff s use of his 
property. Nor does their denial of his annexation petition or the 
other allegations in plaintiff's complaint cause the court to 
believe justice or fairness would ever require it to award 
plaintiff damages based on the Council's 2005 decision. 
Plaintiff s complaint does not establish a basis for the court to 
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award declaratory judgment or damages. Plaintiff's rights in the 
land are no different before or after the Park City decision. 
Plaintiff's complaint is dismissed, with prejudice, as to 
its second cause of action. 
Defendant's motion is hereby GRANTED. 
This Ruling and Order is the Order of the court and no 
further order is required. 
DATED this day of April, 2008. 
BY THE COURT: 
-pwssassss, 
BRUCE C. LUBECK 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE &»erss** 
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